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CLOSING THE WORLD’S 
FACTORY
The future of the Pearl River 
Delta during global recession 
 
This paper was initiated as a response to travelling from Hong Kong to Qinmo, a 
rural village in the North West of Guangdong Province in Southern China, where 
we are currently undertaking several architectural projects. These projects are 
pilot projects involving a collaboration between Hong Kong based charities and 
donors and local PRC village officials, teachers and the Ministries of Education 
and Construction. Unlike typical school building projects occurring in China, 
where the emphasis is on expediency and building provision through the prolif-
eration of standard building types, our approach is to create highly specific edu-
cational models that take on additional programmes such as agriculture or public 
space which respond to the specific local village context. Despite their small scale 
these micro-insertions reveal larger processes relating to China’s urban-rural 
divide and the implications of China’s economic reformation. 
 The journey to these sites through China’s urbanized frontier town of Shen-
zhen revealed a diverse landscape that alternated between conditions of urban 
and rural fabric and blurred, ambiguous territories that can be attributed to the 
massive transformation of the Pearl River Delta over the last 30 years, creat-
ing urban centres with populations greater than some of the largest cities in the 
Western world. Fuelled by the relatively buoyant global economy and the West’s 
continued desire for mass-produced goods, this period of unparalleled growth is 
now under threat from the impact of global recession. This paper makes an at-





























sation linked to globalized industrialization and to describe this urban condition 
at the cusp of inevitable change. 
PRD 
The Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) meetings of 1978 initiated a new era of reform in China with Deng 
Xiao Peng as its key instigator. Structured around 4 Modernizations—agriculture; 
industry; national defence; and science and technology—the reforms brought 
about a loosening of state control and an engagement with foreign entities at a 
governmental and commercial level. These reforms represented China’s gradual 
‘opening up’ and in this sense it allowed the processes of globalisation to play a 
critical role in China’s development. Initially the reforms were centred on initiat-
ing rural changes, restructuring the collective farm system by creating incentives 
for farmers to branch into other sectors and also allowing them to sell any sur-
plus produce over the required state quotas at market prices. This shift from the 
collective to the individual was also reflected in industry allowing factory manag-
ers to have more control over their workforce, output and potential side-line in-
dustries and to also produce beyond state-quotas. Rhetorically “capitalist” forces 
were used to trigger “socialist production”.1
This stirring of market forces at the level of rural peasants was matched by 
a new era of foreign policy. Engagement with the United States signalled a new 
opening of trade relations: at the same time the U.S completely severed diplo-
matic ties with Taiwan, China ordered planes from Boeing and signed a deal 
with Coca Cola allowing the sale of their product in China. Taiwan itself was 
pragmatically seen as a model for economic growth; in 1979 it had only 8% of the 
PRC’s total population, yet 6 times its GNP2. The Taiwanese had created Export 
Processing Zones that created favourable conditions for trade exports stimulat-
ing an influx of foreign investment. This model was appropriated and re-branded 
by Deng Xiao Peng as Special Economic Zones (SEZ) of which four were launched 
in 1979. Shenzhen was one of these. Although just a small fishing village in 1979, 
Shenzhen was strategically located directly across the border from Hong Kong, by 
then an established global financial centre. 
Through these shifts in policy, Deng Xiao Peng foresaw the potential for China 
to act as fertile territory for the expression of late capitalism in built form. The 
1  Spence, Jonathan D.: The Search for Modern China, W. W. Norton & Company, New York 
London, 1999, Ch. 24, Redefining Revolution.
















continued commoditisation of goods, worldwide consumption and expanded field 
of production centres made possible through globalization prioritized affordable 
and available land, cooperative governmental control, and an abundance of cheap 
labour. This labour was fuelled by the growing migrant population that began to 
flock into the new centres of production of the SEZs. This was further encouraged 
by a later policy in 1983 that allowed rural citizens to work in designated urban 
areas legally without changing their citizen status. In 1984 Document Number 
1 brought about additional policy changes that further evolved market forces. 
Again these were embedded in rural organizations allowing collective investment 
into joint enterprises and for villagers to have control over land use and develop-
ment rights. These initiatives were instrumental in setting up the specific forces 
promoting urbanisation through rural agents. The interconnectivity between lo-
cal rural collectives, the economic desirability of the SEZs and the forces of the 
global market created the conditions for unprecedented urbanization. Shenzhen 
SEZ acted as a mediator between global entities and local enterprises with rural 
collectives or individuals acting as opportunistic and entrepreneurial agents for 
industrial production, land use contracting, or indeed property development. In 
1984 the Pearl River Delta was formalized as one of three development triangles 
alongside the Min River Delta (Fujian) and the Yangzi River Delta (Shanghai) 
targeted for continued economic growth. This stimulated competition between cit-
ies to gain foreign investment with satellite towns such as Dongguan directly un-
dercutting costs of Shenzhen, allowing the city to develop extremely fast. Spurred 
on by the globalisation of markets, the PRD became the World’s Factory, exposing 
the simultaneous horror and attraction attributable to the creation of instant cit-
ies with a floating itinerant population in Guangdong Province alone in excess of 
25 million.3
Such unbridled urbanisation related to industrialisation has not been wit-
nessed in this intensity since the advent of the world’s first industrialised city, 
19th century Manchester. If Manchester exhibited a specific form of urbanization 
related to industrial processes in the 19th century, we can see an equally specific 
form of urban growth occurring in Detroit in the 20th century. Both these cities 
emerged from particular industrial contexts that shaped their urban form. In each 
case globalisation became an increasingly important emergent force that acted to 
transform each city through periods of boom or bust. It is our intention to consid-
er the urbanisation processes in Shenzhen and Dongguan as part of this lineage: 
as a study of the 21st century City of globalised industrialisation. 





























Urbanisation and Industrial Growth: Historical Context 
Between 1750 – 1900 Manchester was a city that emerged as a bi-product of un-
trammelled capitalism arising from the industrial production of cotton. It was the 
first time the processes of the city and urbanization became directly linked to the 
processes of industrialization. Operating like a borderless SEZ, Manchester and 
its region had loose governmental controls, an open economy for investment and 
entrepreneurship, a constellation of existing trades from weavers to engineering 
companies as well as an influx of cheap labour from Ireland. The period of inven-
tion in technology furthered production methods setting up new social relations 
between worker and industrialist through the mechanisms of the factory and the 
warehouse and between 1774 – 1801 the population trebled.4 
The graphic portrayal of the city of Manchester in 1853 by Engels5 described a 
city organized according to the inequality produced by these new social relations; 
the slum dwellings of migrant workers located behind the facade of merchant 
warehouses protected the new bourgeoisie from having to witness the conditions 
endemic to the new system. 
The key characteristics of this industrial revolution—the coupling of cheap 
labour alongside mechanic invention—together with increased global influences 
engendered Manchester’s inevitable downfall. The end of the First World War 
opened up new markets and released control of textile production in British colo-
nies such as India, bringing competition to Manchester’s textile trade. The in-
creased possibility of global competition as well as technological advances in the 
U.S. set about a slow burn of economic decline that was to continue throughout 
the 20th Century. The further decentralization of factories and suburbanisation 
after World War II, coupled with large-scale urban planning strategies promoting 
satellite towns and tabula-rasa housing developments attempted to reconfigure 
Manchester’s industrial legacy. However the continued demise of the city was 
predicated on the city’s inability to compete with new global industrial processes, 
seeking cheaper available land and cheaper labour markets. 
If Manchester fell victim to the first phase of globalisation, then Detroit was a 
casualty of phase two. Detroit’s rapid urban growth was in direct correlation to 
the boom of the motorcar industry particularly in line with new mechanisms of 
productivity brought about by Ford’s mass-assembly line. The influx of migrant 
4  See Hall, Peter: “The First Industrial City: Manchester 1760 – 1830”. In: Cities in Civilisa-
tion, Pantheon Books, New York, c1998.
5  Engels, Friedrich: The condition of the working class in England / Translated and edited 
















labourers from America’s South as well as from Canada, England, and Poland 
meant that in 1900, 1 in 3 Detroiters were immigrants. Further waves of migra-
tion occurred due to the economic attraction of Ford’s $5 basic wage and 5 day 
working week. In 1917 Ford’s River Rouge Plant was the World’s largest factory 
employing 100,000 workers. Unlike Manchester, the workers now had money to 
consume; creating an economic cycle of productivity and consumption that de-
fined the workings of market capitalism. Indeed Ford’s dream was “to build a car 
for the great multitude”. 
Post-war decentralization was exacerbated by the Federal Highway Act of 
1956 extending the highway infrastructure allowing simultaneous suburbanisa-
tion and relocation of factories. Coupled with racial tension and housing policies 
that favoured homogeneity and annexation, the city was gradually abandoned, 
suffering a 50% loss of population from 1950-90 with the city centre changing from 
being 85% white to 85% black. The industrial processes also evolved character-
izing the second phase of globalisation into a more networked and sub-contracted 
model. Not only were factories located in suburban areas but also parts could be 
manufactured elsewhere according to cheaper labour, raw materials and spe-
cializations. The increased reliance on global markets also made the industries 
more susceptible to global economic changes; the oil crisis of the 1970s as well as 
increased competition from Japanese carmakers decimated Detroit’s manufactur-
ers and furthered the city’s decline (fig. 1).
The examples of Manchester and Detroit signify both the development of 
urban growth related to specific sectors of industrialization (textiles and the 
motorcar), and the effect of globalisation, in terms of production and in terms of 
the adverse susceptibility of the marketplace. Both cities exhibited extreme forms 
of urban shrinkage that left their city cores abandoned, with a legacy of vacated 
industrial factories, warehouses and plants. In this context Shenzhen and Dong-
guan can be considered as examples of a third phase of urbanisation related to 
industrialisation that has been defined by, if not constructed from, processes of 
globalisation. What differentiates Shenzhen and Dongguan from their predeces-





























sors is that urban processes are intertwined with rural processes to the extent 
that rural agents are active participants in the creation of urban fabric.
Unlike Manchester and Detroit, which exhibited an urban crisis as a result of 
decentralisation and suburbanisation, Dongguan and Shenzhen have no centre: 
they are already created as a decentralized sprawl. In addition, the mechanisms 
of urbanisation originating in the rural produce a specific form of differentiated 
urban fabric creating incoherent adjacencies between banana trees and high rise 
developments, remnants of fish ponds and factories (fig. 2).
As rapidly as they have been urbanized the cities of the PRD are now facing the 
impact of global recession. Given the reliance on the West’s continued demand for con-
sumer products to sustain this growth it is unsurprising that it is estimated that since 
the advent of the downturn almost 2 million people have left Dongguan over a 6 month 
period to return home. The question is whether this dramatic event presents a sudden 
urban crisis for the cities of China’s Pearl River Delta or if this is in fact a consequen-
tial and expected outcome of the market driven forces, which these cities exemplify. 
Nowhere else have cities been so directly built on capitalistic principles albeit these 
cities are the result of experiments in capitalism by a socialist regime. 
Rural Capitalism
China has always relied on the power of its masses. The socialist revolution was 
built around the identification with the rural. With a rural population totalling 
700 million, the reforms of the Deng Xiao Peng era propelled these farmers into 
new roles as potential market entrepreneurs, a form of Rural Capitalism that 
fuelled the growth of new urban China. Under the current framework of the com-
mune system, rural land is owned collectively, something that is not possible for 
urban dwellers who lease land from the state. The differential between urban and 
rural dwellers is reinforced by the Hukou or household registration system that 
dates back to the Mao era, stipulates different rights for urban and rural citizens, 
mostly to the detriment of rural households, with urban citizens being privileged 
for health, education and welfare benefits. However the fact that rural dwellers 















own land, even collectively, with increased freedom of land use, gives the farmers 
of China an inherent capitalistic edge and financial bargaining tool.
Since the 1990’s the PRD cities such as Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Zhuhai and 
Foshan have begun reforming this system even further to speed the conversion 
of farmland into urban land. These actions transformed the existing “collective 
ownership system” into what was strategically termed the “rural shareholding co-
operative system”. In the region of Dongguan, as a result of implementing these 
reforms from 2004 – 2006, nearly 3000 shareholding cooperatives have been estab-
lished. These co-operatives are essentially business entities with shareholders, 
allowing farmers to conduct business freely with outside investors and develop-
ers. Also, as wealth is accumulated primarily through land development, it facili-
tates a better system of returns and better control over land appreciation. One 
could argue that even though the farmers are still limited in terms of individual 
ownership, they now have the status of corporate shareholders. This mechanism 
in effect created 3000 new corporations with substantial capital in the form of 
prime land.
Market Urbanism 
Dongguan is an administrative region situated in the Pearl River Delta. Similar in 
size to neighbouring Shenzhen and Guangzhou, it is mostly defined as rural terri-
tory yet is one of the densest factory agglomerations in the world. The registered 
population is only 1.6 million but its real population is estimated being closer to 
10 million. It is also one of the richest cities in China. Though essentially urban, 
the official rural status of most of Dongguan has allowed for it to develop in a 
uniquely capitalistic manner far in advance of the other cities in the PRD. The 
huge work force is made up primarily of migrant labour freely circulating from 
factory to factory. This seemingly random landscape seems to promote fluidity 
above all else. Analogous to how the global economy needs fluidity of capital in 
order to function, the market urbanism of Dongguan relies on the fluidity of 
capita. The constant supply and free movement of labour is a major incentive 
for factories. There are many channels for sourcing labour: private companies 
operate large employment centres where higher-end jobs are posted, sometimes 
companies that require large numbers of factory workers recruit directly from 
vocational schools in other provinces of China, and word of mouth between villag-
ers encourages migration to factories.
Focusing on a township in Dongguan called Changping, one can easily see that 
gated factories and gated communities proliferate as self-reliant systems of work 




























vide all public spaces, recreational facilities and housing. As well as the factories, 
Dongguan has the highest number of luxury hotels in the PRD, ranking third in all 
of China behind Shanghai and Beijing. The hotels become the live-in homes of for-
eign investors and are compacted with all programs, from sex to golf accessories. 
Such is the regular flux of foreign businessmen that entire gated communities 
become dedicated to the maintenance of second wives and families. 
Although Dongguan is a virtual landscape of global corporate brands, it is 
clearly not a global city. The corporate inhabitants of this city are not interested 
in what goes on outside of the gates of organized labour and production. For a 
city that exceeds the population of London it lacks urbanity. Compared to other 
developing cities asserting their global status through edifying skyscrapers, this 
city has built no skyscrapers—for a city of nearly 10 million inhabitants it is ex-
tremely flat. 
Urban-Rural Fabric
Yuyuan High Tech Optoelectronics Estate was founded in 1993 by Taiwan Bao-
cheng Group, the largest shoe manufacturing enterprise in the world as a con-
trolled factory complex with 18 Taiwanese factories producing shoes and elec-
tronics. A gated factory complex, it is organized to be self-reliant, complete with 
a health centre, sports fields, shops and restaurants. During its peak there were 
as many as 100,000 workers. Currently the number has dropped to 40,000 as a 
result of the downturn, resulting in the closing of commercial facilities, and the 
vacancy of factory worker’s quarters.6 Ms. Chen, originally from Gansu province 
opened a Sichuan-style restaurant in 2007. Since New Year the job losses have 
impacted her business and others with 10 shops and restaurants closing down in 
the same street. In order to attract tenants, Yuyuan has cut rents from 5,400 RMB 
per month to 3,000 RMB per month. In an interview with a young worker, Ms. Yin7 
6  Interview with local resident Mrs. Chen, 20 March 2009.
7  Interview with local worker, Ms. Yin, 20 March 2009.















said that despite job losses recruitment is still continuing, however this seems 
premised on the replacement of dissatisfied workers rather than on expansion. 
There are about 10,000 workers in her shoe factory working over nine hours a 
day, five and a half days a week for a wage of 1,100 to 1,300 RMB per month. The 
current pressure of the marketplace is forcing factory owners to demand more of 
their workers for less; those that leave are soon replaced (fig. 3).
Two other case studies, Batou village and Jianshazhou village, illustrate dif-
ferent scales of land development from the point of view of rural development. 
Batou village was incorporated into the urban jurisdiction of the district, which 
created the stimulus for the village committee to lease a large tract of land to an 
outside developer. In return the villagers received two forms of compensation: an 
apartment unit will be given to each family in the new residential towers and the 
village committee will also distribute a share of the rental fee, roughly 200 RMB 
per month. At present the development is only partially complete leaving a residu-
al patchwork of agricultural land, still farmed by the villagers for bananas, water 
spinach and strawberries, growing between residential slab blocks (fig. 4).
In Jianshazhou Village, part of the agricultural land was sold to a factory over 
10 years ago. In anticipation the villagers built houses on their own small piece of 
land as a means to make profit from leasing them out to migrant workers. Unfor-
tunately, the factory abandoned its project midway and has left the villagers and 
their half-built homes in limbo. At the same time the villagers developed two high-
rise blocks for sale to urban dwellers. The patchwork urban fabric is completely 
incoherent—part ruin, part new build enclave, part demolished factory, and part 
agricultural plots (fig. 5).
Investment Farmers 
These processes demonstrate the transformation of collective village enterprises 
from agricultural producers to micro-developers. These commercial enterprises 
have been developing projects in conjunction with larger developers or indepen-
dently building 3 – 4 story blocks for migrant workers with shops and restaurants 




























on the ground floor. In turn, the shops are generally leased out by starting busi-
nesses, often by former migrant labourers that have saved up enough capital from 
their years of factory work. It is important to remember that 30 years ago there 
were only farmers. Now a slow process of social and economic differentiation ac-
companies the formation of uncertain urban territory. This economic reform has 
created divisions of wealth that infiltrate everyday life and habits. The custom of 
handing out cigarettes alongside one’s business card whenever you meet a new 
person is indicative of wealth according to the brand of cigarette one smokes and 
therefore offers to others. Brands are status symbols with prices varying from 7 
RMB to 50 RMB a pack, used to signify whether you earn 1,000 or 5,000 RMB per 
month. This simple formality at every business dinner typifies the gradual pro-
cess of economic differentiation for this new class of Chinese businessmen. 
Future Speculations
The characteristics as described above of third phase industrialization linked 
to globalization are very different from the preceding examples of Detroit and 
Manchester. In this context will the effect of recession at the scale predicted in 
the PRD create an unprecedented urban crisis for Chinese cities similar to the 
decimating shrinkage that occurred in Detroit and Manchester? Or is the system 
itself flexible and adaptive? Will the newly produced urban territory be sacrificed 
and abandoned with the countryside simply re-absorbing the workers? It is too 
still early to tell, however what seems to be clear is that unlike Detroit and Man-
chester, the crisis will not be a crisis of the core in relation to the periphery. The 
dual processes of suburbanization and decentralization of industries leading to 
an abandonment of the core profoundly affected both of these cities. In the case 
of the urban territory in cities such as Dongguan, the urban processes are rooted 
in an already sprawl-like condition—there cannot be a crisis of the core when the 
city itself has no definable centre. If anything, the future of such cities concerns 
itself with how to re-centralise and begin to provide something that constitutes an 
urban centre. Unfortunately in Dongguan this leads to the iconic construction of 















vast civic plazas, iconic theatres designed by foreign architects and new govern-
ment headquarters: symbols of centrality yet missing the textured richness of a 
variegated urban fabric. The recession may provide the opportunity for further 
attempts to organize these cities. However, the key problem is to recognize these 
urban aggregations as having their own characteristics and qualities rather than 
to try and make them fit to a generic idea of civic centrality. 
On a larger scale, the economic reforms and rapid urbanization over the last 
thirty years in China have exacerbated the urban-rural division amongst its 
population. This is further demarcated through the registration policy separating 
those who are Hukou-registered and those who aren’t with different rights and 
services available to each group. Recent policies introduced by the government in-
dicate a desire to reduce the agricultural workforce by 300 million people through 
continued urbanisation to begin to re-address the balance of economic disparity 
between the urban rich and the rural poor. However, as we have demonstrated, 
the driver of such urbanisation has been the growth of China’s export market to 
consumers in the West. As the recession slows this market-driven process, China 
has no alternative but to try to stabilize its own economy by relying less on its 
export market and trying to encourage domestic consumption. In fact domestic 
spending compared to GDP has declined by 10% to just 33% of GDP from 1997 to 
2007 and compares to figures of 53% India, and 58% for Brazil.8 New policies to 
encourage spending are being tested that include government discounts on goods 
such as TVs and domestic appliances as well as a consideration to overhaul the 
land rights policy which could allow rural dwellers to use their land as equity, 
therefore freeing up capital for investment or consumption. 
The urban-rural tension in China and the different rights of citizens has 
played a major role in the rapid urban growth and economic change within the 
last thirty years and has given rise to the creation of a blurred urban-rural terri-
tory, instigated by complex global forces and opportunistic farmer-developers. It 
is this very tension between the urban and the rural, which is now becoming a key 
issue in how the future of this urban landscape will develop during conditions of 
worldwide recession. 
8  Huang, Yasheng: “Reviving China’s Rural Miracle”, In: The Guardian Weekly, 22.05.09., p. 19.
